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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a municipal 
corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD COM-
MISSION; OSCAR A. ROBIN; and HARDY 
SCALES CO., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE NO. 14030 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT, OGDEN CITY, THAT APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY WAS NOT TIMELY FILED MISCONSTRUES 
THE LAW. 
Ogden City argues that Gibbons and Reed Company's 
claim for damages was not timely under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953 be-
cause it was not filed within ninety days after the cause 
of action arose* 
The city's reliance on the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act is misplaced in light of Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 
P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). In Greenhalgh the court had to deter-
mine whether the operation of a hospital by Payson City was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a "governmental function" as used in the context of 
63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 to bring the hospital 
within the scope of our Governmental Immunity Act. Sec-
tion 63-30-3 provides: 
Except as may be otherwise provided 
in this act, all governmental entities shall 
be immune from suit for any injury which may 
result from the activities of said entities 
wherein said entity is engaged in the exer-
cise and discharge of a governmental function*, 
[Emphasis added]. 
The court considered the arguments that the term "govern-
mental function" should be interpreted to mean any activity 
performed by a governmental entity but rejected this argu-
ment in favor of the more traditional approach: 
It is certain that prior to this en-
actment those terms ['governmental1 and 
•proprietary1] had been widely used and had 
come to have distinct and antithetical mean-
ings in our law. We should assume that the 
legislature was aware of this and that they 
used their language advisedly. Therefore, 
if it had intended to include proprietary 
functions within the scope of the act, it 
could have easily so indicated by omitting 
the final phrase, "governmental function," 
from the just quoted Section 63-30-3. 
* * * 
It is therefore our conclusion that 
proprietary functions of a municipality are 
not within the coverage of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act." 530 P.2d at 801. 
Because the 90-day provisions of 63-30-13 apply only 
to claims arising from the exercise of a "governmental 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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function" and not those arising from the exercise of a 
"proprietary" function, it is necessary to distinguish the 
two concepts. In Greenhalgh the court discussed important 
factors in making that distinction: 
A primary one is whether the activity 
is something which is done for the general-
public good and which is generally regarded 
as a public responsibility. Coupled with 
this, other matters considered are whether 
there is any special pecuniary benefit 
to the City; and also, whether it is of 
such a nature as to be in competition 
with free enterprise. 
These same factors were cited by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961) 
and Ramairez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 463 (1955) 
as tests to determine whether a function is governmental or 
proprietary. 
On the basis of the above factors the activities of 
respondent Ogden City were clearly proprietary in nature and 
the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act are inapplicable to this action. 
Furthermore, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act took 
effect as of July 1, 1966, and applies only to claims arising 
after that date. Chapter 139, §37, laws of Utah 1965. The 
plaintiff's claim arose at the time of the city's repudia-
tion or total breach in May, 1966. Restatement of Contracts, 
§318. The Governmental Immunity Act was not yet in effect. 
-3-
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Even if it were questionable whether the limitation 
period prescribed in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act or 
the provisions of 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated 1953 were 
applicable to the case at bar, this court should adopt the 
statute permitting the claim to be filed. With regard to 
the construction of statutes requiring notice, 56 Am.Jur. 
2d, Municipal Corporations, §687 states: 
Statutory and charter provisions con-
ditioning the right to maintain an action 
against a municipal corporation upon the 
giving of certain prescribed notice within 
a specific time after accrual of the cause 
of action are in derogation of the common 
right of the people of a commonwealth to 
maintain their common-law or statutory causes 
of action anywhere within a state where the 
proper venue attaches, under the same rules 
of practice and procedure accorded them at 
any other point or place in the state. Ac-
cordingly, such provisions are to be construed 
strictly and not extended by implication beyond 
their own terms, where they are invoked by a 
municipality to avoid liability. * *.*. 
As to proprietary activities, 10-7-77 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953 sets forth the requirements for making claims 
against cities and towns. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, supra. 
The first sentence of that section deals with defective, un-
safe, dangerous or obstructive conditions of streets, alleys, 
etc.. The second sentence of that section, which governs 
plaintiff's claim, states: 
Every claim, other than claims above-
mentioned, against any city or town, must be 
presented, properly itemized or described 
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and verified as to correctness by the claim-
ant or his agent, to the governing body with-
in one year after the last item of such ac-
count or claim accrued, and if such account 
or claim is not properly or sufficiently item-
ized or described or verified, the governing 
body may require the same to be made more spe-
cific as to itemization or description, or to 
be corrected as to the verification thereof. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Ogden City contends that even under 10-7-77 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, the action was not timely filed on September 
3, 1968, because Gibbons and Reed relies upon repudiation 
of the option in May, 1966, and the last day in which a claim 
could be filed would be in May, 1967. But no actionable 
claim arose until damages were sustained. The precise sum 
in which Gibbons and Reed Company would be damaged, if at 
all, could not be determined until completion of the strip-
ping, hauling, and placing of material from the alternative 
sites and the rehabilitation of those sites. 
In Boulder City v. Miles, 85 Nev. 46, 449 P.2d 1003 
(1969), a city subdivided a tract of land, grading and com-
pacting the soil. Approximately two years after completion 
of the city's work, the plaintiffs1 house began to crack 
due to faulty compaction of the soil. The city argued that 
the time for filing a notice of claim began to run from the 
last date it worked on the lots, while the plaintiff urged 
that it commenced when the actual damages occurred. Re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
jecting the city's position, the court said: 
It is true that in most cases damages 
caused by the wrongful act of another occur 
contemporaneously with the wrongful act. 
But it is also true that no one has a claim 
against another without having incurred dam-
ages. And the reason for the rule is quite 
clear. Though an act may endanger the per-
son or property of another, no actionable 
wrong is committed if the danger is averted. 
It is only the injury to a person or the dam-
age to property arising from a wrongful or 
negligent act which constitutes an invasion 
of a personal right protected by law and, 
therefore, an actionable wrong. A cause of 
action accrues only when the forces wrong-
fully put in motion produce an injury. Other-
wise, in certain cases, as in this case, a 
purported cause of action might be barred be-
fore liability arose. [Emphasis added and 
citations omitted]. 
In the instant case, damages could not be determined 
until completion of the project, and plaintiff's filing is 
therefore timely whether computed from the date of its last 
work in the alternate pits (October, 1967) or rehabilitation 
of the pits (March, 1968). 
The language of 10-7-77 clearly contemplates the filing 
of notice and the running of the time for doing so after the 
amount of damages is determined. The statute provides that 
claims must be presented within "one year after the last 
item of such account or claim accrued." That the ascertain-
ment of such damages cannot be properly made and presented 
until the last item of damages accrues is indicated by the 
i 
i 
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requirement of "sufficient" and "specific" itemization. See 
Moran v. Salt Lake City, 53 Utah 407, 173 Pac. 702 (1918). 
The provisions of 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated 1953 are 
substantially the same as Section 312, Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1907, construed by the Utah Supreme Court in Dahl v. 
Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 Pac. 622 (1915). With respect 
to the notice of claim provisions, the court said: 
* * * It will be noticed that the statute 
is comprehensive and sweeping in its terms 
respecting the claims that must be presented 
to the city council before an action can be 
brought and successfully maintained thereon. 
These claims are divided into two classes: 
one class consists of claims "for damages or 
injury alleged to have been caused by the de-
fective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed con-
dition of any street, alley, crosswalk, side-
walk, culvert or bridge," which must be pre-
sented "within thirty days after the happening 
of such injury or damage." The other class 
consists of "every claim, other than the claims 
above mentioned," must be presented, properly 
itemized or described, etc., within one year 
after the last item of such "account or claim" 
accrued. 
The court held that injuries to crops alleged to have 
been caused by seepage water from the defendant's canal 
came within the second class of cases, and that the claim 
had to be filed within one year after the last item of 
damage accrued. This position is consistent with the gen-
eral limitations rule applying to breach by anticipatory 
repudiation. Restatement of Contracts, §322. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF!S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
Respondents Ogden City and Robin and Hardy Scales 
Company argue that the option agreement is unenforceable 
because it does not comply with the Statute of Frauds. It 
is contended that the Statute of Frauds require the writing 
to contain all elements of the contract and the option does 
not define the amount of fill to be removed. 
In response to this argument Gibbons and Reed Company 
contends that the option is not covered by the statute of 
frauds, the option is sufficiently certain and the city is 
estopped to assert the statute of frauds. 
The September 30, 1965 "Option For Purchase Of Road 
Building Material" makes it clear that the contract was 
not a sale of an estate in land or even a mining interest, 
but merely a right to remove certain materials from the 
property. The option specifies that it is for sale of "road-
building material from the property of the owner" and that 
the Road Commission does not have a "right to all materials 
on the above described property." 
The material referred to consists of sand and gravel 
and, in the context of this case, do not fall within the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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statute of frauds. In 37 C.J.S., Statute of Frauds, 
§83(b) it is stated: 
A mineral, while it remains in the soil 
is part of the real estate so that a contract 
for its sale in such state is within the sta-
tute of frauds; but a contract for the sale 
of a mineral as such, severed from the soil, 
is not one for the sale of land within the 
statute of frauds. 
It is immaterial who severs the mineral from the soil. 
The fact remains that the only interest to be acquired by 
Gibbons and Reed Company would be a right to the minerals 
from the property. 
Even if the option agreement were to fall within the 
statute of frauds the contract would be enforceable. The 
purpose of the statute is to prevent fraud or, in other 
words, to prevent a party from being held responsible by 
oral, and perhaps false, testimony for a contract he claims 
he never made. 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statute of Frauds, §510. With 
this purpose in mind recent decisions from this court have 
enforced contracts despite the fact the entire contract 
was not reduced to writing. 
In Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974), 
the plaintiff, an experienced miner and mining operator, 
alleged that he entered into a joint venture contract with 
the defendant, owner of certain mining claims in Piute 
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County, to discover and produce ore. The alleged contract 
was based in part on conversations between the parties when 
they were alone, conversation in the presence of third par-
ties and certain writings in the form of letters. The let-
ters did not precisely set forth the terms of the agreement 
nor did they describe the claims. In fact, no writing made 
mention of the mining claims or indicated that plaintiff 
was to have an interest in the land. All that was clear 
was that if a company was formed to operate the claims the 
parties were to share equally in that company. No company 
was formed and defendant eventually sold the mining claims. 
Plaintiff then brought this action to recover the value of 
his alleged interest in the mining claims by virtue of the 
purported joint venture agreement. Despite the absence of 
a clear and unambiguous writing the court held plaintiff 
was entitled to share equally with defendant in the proceeds 
of the sale. 
In Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 469 
(1959) , the defendant partnership promised plaintiff in 
writing a 10% interest in the company if plaintiff would 
continue working for the partnership. Plaintiff worked for 
the company an additional three years and defendant refused 
to distribute a 10% interest to plaintiff. The partnership 
-10-
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defended on the ground the assets of the partnership con-
sisted of leaseholds and interests in lands which had not 
been conveyed in a writing sufficient to satisfy the sta-
tute of frauds. The court refuted the statute of frauds 
defense and made these cogent observations: 
From careful attention to the wording of 
that section it will be seen that there 
is no requirement either that the instru-
ment in writing demonstrate a valid consi-
deration, or that it be a complete contract 
in any other particular. All that is re-
quired is that the interest be granted or 
declared by a writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged. For the purpose of 
establishing that there was such a grant 
by the partnership it is not essential that 
its assets be described with particularity. 
The purpose of the statute is that certain 
matters of great importance such as the 
conveyance of real estate should be protec-
ted against frauds and perjuries. As be-
tween the contesting parties here, that re-
quirement is satisfied by the letter in 
question; and the granting of the 10% of 
the interest in the partnership includes the 
grant of its assets. 
If the option agreement in the case at bar is affected 
by the statute of frauds it is sufficient in form to satisfy 
its requirements. As noted above, the purpose of the sta-
tute is to protect against fraud and perjuries neither of 
which is present in the instant case. The option agreement 
is complete in every respect other than the exact amount of 
fill which could be removed and this term is easily implied. 
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Even if the statute of frauds did apply to this case 
and the option agreement was not sufficient to satisfy its 
requirements, the city is estopped to assert it* The 
function of equitable estoppel is stated at 28 Am.Jur.2d, 
Estoppel and Waiver, §28, and it is submitted that its 
policy is applicable in the case at bar: 
The doctrine of estoppel is based upon 
the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, 
good faith, and justice, and its purpose is 
to forbid one to speak against his own act, 
representations, or commitments to the in-
jury of one to whom they were directed and 
who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine 
of estoppel springs from equitable principles 
and the equities in the case. It is designed 
to aid the law in the administration of justice 
where without its aid injustice might result. 
Estoppel may be used to preclude a party from asserting 
the statute of frauds: 
It is universally conceded that the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel may be invoked to 
preclude a party to a contract from asserting 
the unenforceability of a contract by reason 
of the fact that it is not in writing as re-
quired by the statute of frauds. 73 Am.Jur. 
2d, Statute of Frauds, §565. 
In Mohler v. Park County School District, 32 Col.App. 
388, 515 P.2d 112 (1973) the plaintiff was employed as super-
intendent of schools. At a meeting of the school board a 
resolution was passed to offer plaintiff a contract for the 
upcoming year. Plaintiff was present at the meeting and 
-12-
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thanked the board for their action, intending his thanks 
to operate as an acceptance. Plaintiff returned to school 
believing he was employed for the next school year. In 
the prior year he had accepted a verbal offer and his writ-
ten contract was not executed until after the school year 
began. At a subsequent meeting the school board rescinded 
the resolution to reemploy plaintiff and plaintiff institu-
ted this action for breach of his alleged employment con-
tract. The court held there was sufficient evidence to 
support findings that there had been detrimental reliance on 
the promise and held for plaintiff. 
In Lloyd Crystal Post No. 20 v. Jefferson County, 72 
Ida. 158, 237 P.2d 348 (1951) the city and Legion Post 
entered into an agreement whereby the Legion Post was to 
convey the property to the city and the city would obtain 
federal financial assistance to repair and remodel the 
building thereon. The city would then reconvey the pro-
perty back to the Legion Post when certain mortgages were 
paid. The agreement was performed and the city quit claimed 
the property back to the Legion Post pursuant to resolution 
of the city council. However, respondents alleged that the 
reconveyance was invalid because it was not done in com-
pliance with an Idaho law requiring enactment of an ordinance 
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and the holding of an election after notice in which a 
majority of the electors voted in favor of the reconveyance. 
The court distinguished between contracts absolutely pro-
hibited by statute and contracts which are within the cor-
porate power but which, in the making thereof, some irregu-
larity occurs . The court classified the case as within the 
latter category and held the post received good title and 
the city was estopped from denying the validity of the re-
conveyance. 
In Studer Construction Company v. Rural Special Improve-
ment District No. 208, 148 Mont. 200, 418 P.2d 865 (1966) plain-
tiff was awarded a contract for construction of a sewer. On 
completion the work was okehed by the board of commissioners 
but the city of Billings contended the sewer was inadequate* 
The controversy between the board and city was resolved by 
an agreement whereby the commissioners agreed to pay for ad-
ditional work on portions of the sewer. When the work was 
done the district refused to pay for the entire cost on the 
basis the cost of improvement including extras was over the 
approximate estimate and the contractor brought an action 
for breach of contract. The court ruled the commissioners 
were estopped from asserting the cost of improvement in-
cluding the extras was over the approximate cost and held 
for the contractor. 
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In McDowell v. Cagle, 205 Okla. 554, 240 P.2d 783 
(1952) , a lessor and lessees had an agreement whereby 
they were to share the harvest of alfalfa on the premises. 
When the lessees began harvesting, the lessor pursuaded 
them to postpone doing so until after the expiration of 
the lease since the alfalfa would later be more valuable 
as a seed crop than as hay. 
The lessor argued that for various reasons the oral 
extension of the lease did not constitute a contract. 
The court, estopping the lessor to rely on defects in the 
oral agreement, found that the lessees had relied on the 
oral agreement and changed their position to their detri-
ment. 
This court in Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 
598 (1970), announced adherence to the following definition 
of estoppel set forth in Blacks Law Dictionary: 
"An estoppel by the conduct or admin-
isions of a party * * * it is, and always 
was, a familiar principle in the law of con-
tracts. It lies at the foundation of morals 
and is a cardinal point in the exposition 
of promises, that one shall be bound by the 
state of facts which he has induced another 
to act upon." 
The case at bar is brought within the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel by reason of the city's unconscionable act of 
inducing Gibbons and Reed Company to believe it had an option 
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m 
m 
for materials and to prepare its bid and enter into a con-
tract with the commission on the basis of that belief. The • 
city knew Gibbons and Reed Company was relying on the op-
tion agreement in computing its bid. The discussions be- • 
tween Mike Gibbons and the Assistant City Engineer were re- • 
ported to the City Engineer; and regardless of whether the 
Assistant City Engineer could contract for the city, the I 
notice and knowledge given to him is imputed to the city. 
See 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, §273 et seq.. I 
POINT III m 
RESPONDENTS ROBIN AND HARDY SCALES COMPANY HAVE SUB-
MITTED THEMSELVES TO THE JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURTS. I 
In 1969, the Utah State Legislature enacted 78-27-22 
et seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, hereinafter called the • 
"Long-arm Statute", which provides for the exercise by Utah • 
courts of in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defen-
dants. The legislative purpose in enacting this statute | 
is set forth in 78-27-22 as follows: 
It is declared, as a matter of legis-
lative determination, that the public inter-
est demands the state provide its citizens 
with an effective means of redress against 
non-resident persons, who through certain 
significant minimal contact with this state, 
incur obligations to citizens entitled to 
the state's protection. This legislative 
action is deemed necessary because of tech-
nological progress which has substantially 
increased the flow of commerce between the 
-16-
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several states resulting in increased in-
teraction between persons of this state and 
persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to insure 
maximum protection to citizens of this state, 
should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction 
over non-resident defendants to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, [Emphasis added]. 
The acts whereby a non-resident submits himself to the 
jurisdiction of the Utah courts are outlined in 78-27-24 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953: 
"Any person, notwithstanding section 
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or resi-
dent of this state, who in person or through 
an agent does any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself, and if an individual, 
his personal representative, to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of this state as to any 
claim arising: 
"(1) The transaction of any business 
within this state; 
"(2) . . . 
"(3) The causing of any injury within 
this state, whether tortious or by breach 
of warranty; 
11
 (4) The ownership, use or possession 
of any real estate situated in this state; 
* * * « 
Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales have submitted them-
selves to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts under each of 
the above cited subsections. 
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The initial basis whereby respondents Robin and Hardy 
Scales have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of Utah 
courts is the "transaction of business within this state." 
This term is defined in 78-27-23 as follows: 
"As used in this act: 
* * * 
"(2) The words transaction of busi-
ness within this state1 mean activities 
of a non-resident person, his agent, or 
representatives in this state which affect 
persons or businesses within the State of 
Utah." 
The language of 78-27-24(1) together with the defini-
tion given "transaction of business within this state" in 
78-27-23(2) would, without more, indicate jurisdiction could 
be exercised over non-residents when such non-residents per-
formed virtually any act within this state. While this broad 
reading of the statutory language is limited by the due pro-
cess requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as announced 
by the United States Supreme Court in opinions such as 
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
66 S.Ct. 154 (1945) , McGee v. International Life Insurance 
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199 (1959) and Hansen v. Denkla, 
357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228 (1958), the requirements of 
these cases are satisfied in the case at bar. 
In Hill v. Zale Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 
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332 (1971) , plaintiff, a Utah citizen, brought an action 
against Zale, a Texas corporation, to recover wages, an 
incentive award, vacation pay and moving expenses allegedly 
owed him for services rendered to defendant in Alaska. 
Service of process was made upon one Hankin, an assistant 
vice-president and regional manager of the defendant corpora-
tion. Zale moved to dismiss the action on the ground that 
there had been no proper service of summons upon the defen-
dant. The district court granted the motion and plaintiff 
appealed. 
Remanding the case, the Utah Supreme Court commented 
upon the definition given the term "transaction of business" 
by 78-27-23(2) as follows: 
"It is appreciated that the language 
just quoted is necessarily a broad-sounding 
generality; and it must be so interpreted and 
applied as to confirm with basic concepts of 
fairness and due process of law. This man-
dates that a foreign corporation should not 
be subjected to undue difficulties from law-
suits merely because its products are dis-
tributed in this state or may be purchased 
and sold by others therein. On the other hand, 
when a foreign corporation is permitted to en-
joy the advantages of having activities car-
ried on within a state to further its business 
interests under the protection of its laws, 
it is only fair and reasonable that its citi-
zens have some practical means of redress if 
grievances arise." 482 P.2d 332 at 333, 334. 
[Emphasis added]. 
In Rudd v. Crown International, 26 Utah 2d 263, 488 
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P.2d 298 (1971) , this court upheld jurisdiction over 
a Nevada corporation and indicated that the courts might 
have jurisdiction on the basis of minimal contracts even 
without the Long-Arm Statute. 
It is evident from the decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Hill v. Zale Corporation and Rudd v. Crown Inter-
national , supra.f that when a non-resident corporation pur-
posely carries on economic activities within the State of 
Utah and avails itself of the protection of the laws of Utahf 
then the non-resident corporation has submitted itself to the 
jurisdiction of Utah courts. In the instant case, Hardy 
Scales was conducting its business in Utah, and Robin and 
Hardy Scales negotiated for and entered into a contract for 
the sale of real property located in Utah with representa-
tives of a municipal corporation located in Utah, and have 
engaged in activities in Utah having a pronounced effect 
on the business of a corporation domiciled and doing busi-
ness in Utah. Except for the testimony of Robin and of the 
representatives of Hardy Scales, all evidence and witnesses 
relating to this matter are located in Utah. In view of the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Court of Utah, it is clear that Utah courts have jurisdic-
tion over respondents Robin and Hardy Scales and should 
exercise that jurisdiction. 
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As a second ground for jurisdiction under the Utah 
Long-Arm Statute the respondents Robin and Hardy Scales 
committed a tortious injury within this state by intention-
ally interfering with the contract between appellant and 
the Utah State Road Commission. As a result of the tor-
tious conduct of respondents Robin and Hardy Scales, Gibbons 
and Reed Company was unable to remove roadbuilding materials 
from property located in Ogden City and was, thereby, in-
jured. Appellant's injury arises directly from the tor-
tious conduct of Robin and Hardy Scales which falls clearly 
within the language of 78-27-24(3) Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
The final ground of jurisdiction arises directly from 
the ownership and use by respondents Robin and Hardy Scales 
of real property located in Utah and falls within the pro-
visions of 78-27-24(4). The real property located in Ogden, 
Utah, purchased by respondents Robin and Hardy Scales, was 
subject to the right of appellant to enter upon said property 
and remove therefrom roadbuilding materials. Respondents 
Robin and Hardy Scales have refused, and continue to refuse, 
to allow appellant to enter upon this real property and re-
move roadbuilding materials. 
Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales argue that Gibbons 
and Reed Company has failed to plead facts enumerated in 
the Utah Long-Arm Statute which would vest the Utah court 
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with jurisdiction. Because of this failure it is asserted 
appellant never obtained jurisdiction over respondents I 
Robin and Hardy Scales. 
A district court complaint served under the Long-Arm 
Statute need not allege jurisdictional acts. It is pro- I 
vided in 78-3-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimi-
nal, not excepted in the constitution and 
not prohibited by law; * * * 
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross claim or third party shall con-
tain (1) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief; and (2) the demand for judgment for 
relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
Relief in the alternative or of several dif-
ferent types may be demanded. 
i 
As district courts in Utah are courts of general juris-
diction , claims for relief in actions in such courts do not 
require jurisdictional allegations. 
This question was recently considered by the Nevada 
Supreme Court in Certain-Teed Products Corporation v. Second 
Judicial District, 87 Nev. 18, 479 P.2d 781 (1971). Nevada 
has adopted a long-arm statute virtually identical to that •'.^;'•  ;:»:-
adopted in Utah and, like Utah, Nevada has adopted, with some 
modification, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
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In Certain-Teed, the petitioner moved to quash service 
of process for want of jurisdiction and because service was 
not made upon an authorized person. Petitioner was a foreign 
corporation not qualified to do business in Nevada but had 
supplied building materials for construction of a warehouse• 
The court held that, as plaintiff had failed to submit com-
petent proof of the capacity of petitioner's chief legal 
counsellor to receive service of process , the service should 
have been quashed. The court then stated: 
"The petitioner next contends that 
neither the amended complaint nor the affi-
davit which was filed in support of the 
order authorizing service of process out-
side the State of Nevada contains a suffi-
cient statement of facts to warrant service 
of process or to confer jurisdiction on the 
trial court. However, neither NRS 14.065 
[the Nevada long-arm statute] nor NRCP 4 (d) 
(1) requires an affidavit or order as a pre-
requisite to serve a process. The amended 
complaint does state a claim for relief against 
the petitioner within the framework of NRS 
14.065 when tested by the rules generally ap-
plicable to pleadings. NRCP 8(a). A more de-
tailed statement of facts is not required and 
a failure to allege that the contract was made 
in Nevada is not essential. The pleading is 
adequate to place a claim for relief within 
NRS 14.065 (2) (a). 
CONCLUSION 
The activities of Ogden City complained of by appellant 
arose from the exercise of a proprietary function. In addi-
tion, the first item of appellant's claim accrued prior to 
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July 1, 196 6, the effective date of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. For both of these reasons, appellant's 
claims are not governed by the provisions of that act. 
Under the applicable statute, 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, appellant's claim was timely made as it was filed 
within one year after the last item of the account accrued. 
Appellant's claim is not barred by the statute of 
frauds, since the option agreement is not covered by the 
statute of frauds. Even if it were, the option is suffi-
ciently certain and the city is estopped to assert this 
defense. 
Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales have purposely en-
gaged in economic activities within this state and have 
availed themselves of the benefit and protection of Utah 
law. They are subject to the jurisdiction of Utah's court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
i 
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